Academic accounting journals typically have editorial boards. The editors through personal knowledge and reputation handpick members of these boards. These boards exist to assist the editor in running the journal. In particular, editorial board members are usually involved in the review of research manuscripts. As the publication of research in academic journals is a principal raison d’être for modern academics, editorial board members play a vital institutional and social role. As such, they are sometimes seen as elitist (Lee, 1997; Williams & Rodgers, 1995). Reviewers not only ensure that quality standards are maintained, but they also, in effect direct the pursuance and dissemination of academic research. They are commonly seen as gatekeepers (Beyer, Chanove, & Fox, 1995; Crane, 1967; Gilliland & Cortina, 1997; Parker, Guthrie, & Gray, 1998). Typically, leading journals will reject more articles than they accept, in these cases reviewers act as pre-publication filters.

Appointment to editorial boards is also prestigious. Membership is “a considerable honour that reflects one’s standing in the profession as evaluated by his or her peers” (Kaufman, 1984, p. 1190). The names and institutional affiliations of editorial board members are usually listed in the journal constituting a visible sign of academic success. Academic reputation is normally enhanced by editorial board membership. This reputation reflects back onto the academic institution to which the individual belongs. As a result, there have been many studies of both authors and institutional publishing (see, for example, Heck & Bremser, 1986; Heck, Jensen, & Cooley, 1990). Scholarly productivity has been the centre of many studies which have looked at refereed publications and accounting faculty (see, for example, Brown, 1996; Hasselback & Reinstein, 1995; Hasselback, Reinstein, & Schwan, 2000). Indeed, the importance of publishing in refereed journals has become so important that some have seen research as being transformed and commodified into a homogenised and tradeable commodity which exclude other forms of publication (Gray, Guthrie, & Parker, 2002).

The review process in most academic accounting journals is usually relatively homogeneous. Editors are sent manuscripts by authors. These manuscripts are often the product of considerable amounts of time and effort (Schneider, 1985, chap. 16). The editors then initially pre-screen the papers before sending out papers to independent academics for peer review. They often use review board members, but these are commonly supplemented by ad hoc reviewers. The reviewers will give their opinions on the papers and return their comments to the editors. The editors advise the authors whether the paper is rejected or should be revised and resubmitted. There may be two or three rounds for ultimately successful papers.

Despite their influential and powerful roles, however, as Lee (1997) points out, the editorial boards act largely independently of external scrutiny. For instance, the articles are typically reviewed using a blind review where, in theory, only the editor knows the identity of author and reviewers.1 Similarly, the editors’ choice of the editorial board and reviewers is largely unconstrained. Nor is there any independent scrutiny of the reviewers themselves or any independent appeal process for unfavourable decisions. Finally, there is little knowledge of the actual specific criteria which reviewers use to make their decisions—although generally there are broad journal guidelines. On the whole, therefore, the review process lacks transparency.

As far as we know, there has only been one study (Borkowski & Welsh, 1998) which has looked at the review process in accounting in any depth. This is surprising given the active role which the research review process plays in most academic accountants’ careers. In the UK, for example, individual academic institutions are assessed by periodic Research Assessment Exercises, while in the US tenure is often achieved through success in publishing. We complement Borkowski and Welsh’s (1998) study by investigating this topic from the standpoint of review board members rather than editors. In addition, we investigate 83 editor and review practices rather than Borkowski and Welsh’s 19. The purpose of this article is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the nature, role and function of editorial boards in accounting. We focus on the role of the review board and the respective role of the editor and reviewers. We use a questionnaire-based approach and survey 700 accounting academics who were review board members. As far as we know, this is the first such perceptions-based study in accounting to look at the composition of accounting editorial boards. In addition, this study adds to our limited knowledge about review processes in accounting. The results of this study by throwing some light on the review process should, therefore, prove useful to all those involved in the journal publication process. In particular, it will help to document perceived norms of editor and reviewer behaviour. This is especially helpful given the lack of consensus in the business and management area (Borkowski & Welsh, 1998 in accounting; Von Glinow & Novelli, 1982 in organisational behaviour; and Sherrell, Hair, & Griffin, 1989 in marketing).

The remainder of the article consists of four sections followed by a conclusion. The next section is the literature review. This focuses first on the only extant study of which we are aware on the composition of review boards. It then considers the literature on the review process. Our methods section then follows. In the subsequent section, we present our findings. These are followed by a discussion.

2. Literature review

2.1. Composition of review boards

We know of only one study which looks at the composition of the editorial board. This study in organisational behaviour (Von Glinow & Novelli, 1982) analysed responses for 150 editors, associate editors and review board members from a variety of management journals. The majority of respondents saw no improprietary in creating a geographically unbalanced board (73%) or excluding government or industry reviewers (71%). Strong agreement existed that it was ethical to select reviewers without consideration for race (74%) or sex (72%).

2.2. Ethical boards in accounting

We know of no prior study which looks at individuals’ perceptions of editorial practices. There are, however, four academic studies in accounting which look at institutional representation on editorial boards in accounting and finance journals (Kaufman, 1984, Lee, 1997 and Mittermaier, 1991; Williams & Rodgers, 1995).

Kaufman (1984) studied a small sample of 10 finance journals. He found that the editorial board members were primarily drawn from elite US universities such as Rochester and Chicago. Mittermaier’s (1991) findings confirmed a similar pattern in accounting journals. She studied 13 academic journals and found their editorial boards dominated by graduates of the top US universities.

Lee (1997), Lee and Williams (1999), Rodgers and Williams (1996) and Williams and Rodgers (1995) examine a limited number of journals. Rodgers and Williams (1996) and Williams and Rodgers (1995) focus on The Accounting Review. Williams and Rodgers (1995) find that 15 doctoral degree schools dominated The Accounting Review from 1967 to 1990. They state that “[t]raining at one of the elite schools bestows a distinct privilege on an accounting scholar in that she or he is more likely to be granted power to decide what are admissible knowledge claims than scholars trained at non-elite schools” (Williams & Rodgers, 1995, p. 272). In essence, an elite set of graduate schools produces authors of most of the articles in The Accounting Review. These authors then, in turn, become reviewers. As a result knowledge production in the US becomes very monolithic. Rodgers and Williams, 1996 J.L. Rodgers and P.F. Williams, Patterns of research productivity and knowledge creation at The Accounting Review, The Accounting Historian’s Journal 23 (1996) (1), pp. 51–88.Rodgers and Williams (1996) confirm and extend these findings. Lee (1997) looked at five journals: The Accounting Review (TAR), The Journal of Accounting Research (JAR), The Journal of Accounting and Economics (JAE), Accounting Organisations and Society (AOS), Accounting and Business Research (ABR) and Abacus. He thus covered both US and UK journals. His findings “confirm a dominant presence of elite academics on the editorial boards of elite journals” (Lee, 1997, p. 25). These elite academics were gatekeepers who could significantly control the papers published in these top journals. Lee and Williams (1999, p. 867) also confirm the presence of a “controlling elite within the US accounting research community”.